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NOTES
their quasi-judicial function, or a belated realization of the broader
purposes behind the FTCA, is difficult to judge. Whatever the
reason, the judiciary has shown a certain empathy with the
Commission to the extent that the above general rules have become
crystallized during recent years.
The new ruling appears to be nothing more than an ex-
press acknowledgement of the fact that the consumer does rely
on tests and demonstrations, whether or not he has a traditional
legal right to do so. It is a realistic rule which admits to the
frailties of human nature and recognizes that the passage of the
FTCA was prompted by a similar admission. Certainly the ad-
vertiser is aware of consumer motivation. If he were not, there
would have been little need for legislation. Is it therefore un-
reasonable to warn an advertiser, who exploits the consumer's
reliance on tests and demonstrations, that he shall be no more
deceitful in presenting the proof which induces the sale than in
alleging the quality itself?
ORGANIZATIONAL AND RECOGNITION PICKETING:
PERMISSIBLE ACTIVITY UNDER THE LANDRUM - GRIFFIN
AMENDMENTS
The Labor Management Relations Act [hereinafter referred to
as the Act] insures to employees "the right to self-organi-
zation . . . [and] to bargain collectively through represent-
atives of their own choosing . . . and to refrain from any
or all such activities ... ." 1 To further secure these rights,
the Act was amended in 1959, and several new unfair labor
practices, restricting certain union activities, were incorporated
therein.2 One of the new provisions, Section .8(b) (7) (C) of the
1 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 7, 61 Stat.
140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Taft-Hartley].
For two cases which construe the purpose of the act see NLRB v. Red
Arrow Freight Lines, Inc., 213 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Scullin
Steel Co., 161 F2d 143 (8th Cir. 1947).2 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-
Griffin Act) § 704(c), 73 Stat. 544, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (Supp. II, 1961)
[hereinafter cited as Landrum-Griffin]. For a good discussion of the 1959
amendments to the act see Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the
National Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN L. REv. 257 (1959). An excellent
analysis of the entire Landrum-Griffin Act is found in Aaron, The Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARv. L. REV.
851 (1960).
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Act as amended, prohibits organizational and recognition picketing
under certain conditions; to what extent, however, is not clear.
3
Recently, on reconsideration of Local Joint Executive Bd. of
Hotel & Restaurant Employees (Crown Cafeteria case), the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board reversed its prior interpretation of
the section as originally promulgated in that case. 4  It will be
the task of this note to present the first Crown Cafeteria case
and the underlying rationale which led to its reversal.
The distinction between recognition and organizational picket-
ing has been called "a purely verbal" one.5 "Picketing for organ-
izational purposes is only fictionally different from picketing for
immediate recognition. . . . The only difference relates not to the
conduct of the union, or its effects, but to the union's explanation
of its conduct. To make legal decisions vary on such a basis seems
peculiar, if not unique."6 For purposes of discussion in this
note, however, the distinction will be made.
Organizational picketing is directed at the employees of the
picketed employer to persuade them to join the union. 7  The
3As former member of the NLRB Jenkins said: "A mere reading of
section 8(b)(7) indicates that the problems raised are legion. One of the
serious problems concerns the proviso to section 8(b)(7)(C) permitting
'picketing for the purpose of truthfully advising the public."' Jenkins,
A Preliminary Look At Title VII, in SYMPOSIUm ON THE LABOR-MANAGE-
-MENT REPORTING AND DiscLOsuRE AcT OF 1959 615, 627 (1961).
4 1961 CCH N.L.R.B. 19672 (Feb. 20, 1961), rev'd on rehearing, 4 CCH
LAB. L. REP. (LAB. REL.) (CCH N.L.R.B.) ff 10939 (Feb. 20, 1962).
5 Cox, supra note 2, at 265. See Rains, The Current Status of Organ-
izational or Recognition Picketing, 7 LAB. L.J. 539 (1956).
6 Petro, Recognition of Picketing Under the NLRA, 2 LAB. L.J. 803,
805 (1951). That the experts do not agree that the distinction between
recognition and organizational picketing exists see Petro, Free Speech and
Organizational Picketing in 1952, 4 LAB. L.J. 3 (1953). For a case where
the distinction is recognized by the court see Wood v. O'Grady, 307 N.Y.
532, 122 N.E2d 386 (1954).
7 Pappas v. Local Joint Executive Ed., 374 Pa. 34, 36-37, 96 A.2d 915,
916 (1953). See FINLEY, UNDERSTANDING THE 1959 LABOR LAw 31-32
(1960); Bornstein, Organizational Picketing in American Law, 46 Ky. L.J.
25, 27 (1957). But see Meltex, Inc. v. Livingston, 28 CCH Lab. Cas.
69483, at 89875 (1955). "Whenever a union pickets the place of business
of an employer whose employees do not belong to a union, it necessarily
brings pressure to bear upon the employer and makes it at least likely that
that employer will endeavor to relieve the pressure by doing something to
get his employees to join the union which is doing the picketing....
I hence think it should be frankly realized [that it] necessarily is an attempt
to cause the employer to commit the unfair labor practice of discriminating
in order to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization,
and hence has an illegal objective."
One author even goes so far as to conclude that organizational picketing
should be outlawed because of its purpose to force employers to coerce
their employees into joining labor unions. Rothenberg, Organizational
Picketing, 5 LAB. L.J. 689, 696 (1954).
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objective is to enroll a majority of the employer's workers among
the union's ranks so as to enable the union to carry out its
functions as the bargaining representative with the employer.
Recognition picketing, on the other hand, is the application of
economic pressure to the employer to cause him to bargain directly
with the union as the legal bargaining representative of the em-
ployees." However, if the picketing union does not represent a
majority of employees in a bargaining unit, and a collective bar-
gaining agreement is signed with the employer, it is subject to
being set aside, as the recognition constitutes an unfair labor
practice.9
Another type of picketing is informational, i. e., picketing to
truthfully advise the public. It is not prohibited by the section
to be discussed, 10 but nonetheless is relevant to this discussion.
Informational picketing seeks to inform the public that the employer
is committing, or has committed, some act inimical to the labor
cause-whether it be an unfair labor practice or some other
act which hinders the union's proper execution of its lawful
activities." Purely informational picketing is completely divorced
from recognition or organizational objectives and merely serves to
inform the public of the situation so that it will act in a manner
to protect the economic interest of the union beyond the scope
of organization or recognition.12  Purely informational picketing
would indeed seem to occur rarely, if ever, because the ultinite
objective of all unions is to organize and be recognized.' 3  Due
to this, courts have sometimes made a distinction between the
ultimate objectives and the immediate objectives of union picketing,
and have not disqualified picketing which merely has such ultimate
objectives from being informational. 14  It is only when the im-
8 See FiNLEY, op. cit. supra note 7, at 31-32; Petro, Recognition and
Organizational Picketing in 1952, 3 LAB. L.J. 819, 820 (1952). The latter
article groups recognition picketing into five fact situations and analyzes the
legality of such picketing under the given circumstances. Id. at 823-24,
885-86.
9 Goettl, d/b/a Int'l Metal Prods. Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 1076 (1953).
'
0 Chefs Local 89, 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. (LAB. REL.) (CCH N.L.R.B.)
f 10940, at 17055 (Feb. 20, 1962); accord, Penello v. Retail Store Employees
Union, 188 F. Supp. 192, 200 (D. Md. 1960). See Feldblum, Section
8(b)(7): The Case of the Puzzling Provisos, 12 LAB. L.J. 502, 519 (1961).
Contra, Kennedy v. Los Angeles Joint Executive Bd. of Hotel & Restaurant
Employees, 192 F. Supp. 339, 342 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
11 See Forkesch, Informational, Representational and Organizational Picket-
ing, 6 LAB. L.J. 843 (1955). "[I]nformational picketing is to convey
information, whether to employees, the employer, or to third parties, as the
public or tradesmen. . .. " Ibid.12Local Joint Executive Bd. of Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 1961
CCH N.L.R.B. f19672, at 15018 (Feb. 20, 1961).
'3 Feldblum, supra note 10, at 509-10.
14 Brown v. Department & Specialty Store Employees' Union, 187 F. Supp.
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mediate object is that of recognition or organization that it has
fallen afoul of the law because of its unlawful nature.15
The Problem Defined
Section 8(b) (7) of the Act provides that it shall be an unfair
labor practice for a union to picket where an object is organization
or recognition under the following conditions: (A) where the
employer has lawfully recognized, in accordance with the Act,
any other labor organization; (13) where a valid NLRB election
has been held within the past twelve months; or (C) where such
picketing has been carried on by an unrecognized union beyond
a reasonable time (not to exceed thirty days) unless the union has
filed a petition for an NLRB election.'6 However, proviso two
of subparagraph (C) reads:
[N]othing in this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to prohibit any
picketing . , . for the purpose of truthfully advising the public . . . that an
employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor
organization [unless it has the effect of inducing employees of others to
619, 623 (N.D. Cal. 1960); Greene v. International Typographical Union,
186 F. Supp. 630, 634 (D. Conn. 1960); Penello v. Retail Store Employees
Union, 188 F. Supp. 193, 201 (D. Md. 1960); Graham v. Retail Clerks
Ass'n, 188 F. Supp. 847, 856 (D. Mont. 1960); Cavers v. Teamsters Local
200, 188 F. Supp. 184, 190 (E.D. Wis. 1960).
1r Cavers v. Teamsters Local 200, supra note 14; Penello v. Retail Store
Employees' Union, supra note 14.
36 Landrum-Griffin § 704(c), 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7)(Supp. IL 1961).
"(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-
(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause
to be picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring
an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the
representative of his employees, or forcing or requiring the employees of
an employer to accept or select such labor organization as their collective
bargaining representative, unless such labor organization is currently certified
as the representative of such employees;
(A) where the employer has lawfully recognized in accordance
with this sub-chapter any other labor organization and a question
concerning representation may not appropriately be raised under section
159(c) of this title,
(B) where within the preceding twelve months a valid election
under section 159(c) of this title has been conducted, or
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition
under section 159 (c) of this title being filed within a reasonable
period of time not to exceed thirty days from the commencement of
such picketing. . . ." Ibid.
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refuse to pick up or deliver goods or perform any services, i.e., refusal to
cross picket lines].17
This proviso has created a problem of interpretation-what is
its function? If an object of picketing is organization, but its
purpose is to truthfully advise the public that the employer does
not employ union members, does proviso two exempt the picketing
from the applicability of subparagraph (C)? In other words, if
an object is recognition or organization is it permissible if the
pressure for this object is to be attained by an appeal to the
public to exert that pressure? Or does the proviso simply protect
picketing which truthfully advises the public that the employer
does not employ union members when it is completely divorced
from an object of recognition or organization? It is the specific
aim of this note to answer these questions.
Generating Factors
Prior to the passage of section 8(b) (7), there were two cases
of importance which represented restrictions on peaceful picketing
not prohibited by section 8(b)(4). The first case was Drivers
Local 639 (Curtis Bros. case),18 decided in 1957. In that case the
union had lost a representation election and the results were
certified. Subsequently the union picketed the employer in order
to obtain recognition and the employer filed a section 8(b) (1) (A)
charge. The Board held that picketing for recognition by a
minority union coerced the employees in exercising their guar-
anteed right to freely choose a collective bargaining representa-
tive, thus resulting in an unfair practice under section 8(b) (1)
(A). 19
On appeal the Board's order was set aside by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia.20 The court felt that the
Board's determination would: (1) effectively expunge Section 13
of the Act 2 ' and render section 8(b) (4) 22 redundant, (2) be
17Landrum-Griffin §704(c), 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §158(b)
(7) (c) (Supp. II, 1961) (emphasis added).
Is 119 N.L.R.B. 232 (1957), set aside and rern'd, 274 F.2d 551 (D.C. Cir.
1958), aff'd, 362 U.S. 274 (1960).29 Id. at 234, 247.2 0 Drivers Local 639 v. NLRB, 274 F.2d 551 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
21 Taft-Hartley § 13, 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1958).
"Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall
be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any
way the right to strike, or to effect the limitations or qualifications on that
right."
22 Taft-Hartley § 8(b) (4), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4)
(1958). Section 8(b) (4) (C) forbade organizational or recognition picketing
1962 ]
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contrary to the intent of Congress as manifested by the legislative
history, and (3) not be in consonance with long established Board
precedent.23
If any doubts existed as to whether or not the Curtis Bros.
doctrine would be restricted to situations where the minority union
had recently lost a Board conducted representation election, they
were soon put to flight. In International Ass'n of Machinists
(Alloy case),24 the minority union had not been recently involved
in an election proceeding. In holding, inter aia, the union guilty
of a section 8(b) (1) (A) violation, the Board stated that such a
finding comported with their decision in Curtis Bros.25 Thus it was
clear that a minority union, whether found to be such by a recent
Board election or otherwise, would be guilty of an unfair labor
practice if it picketed for recoguition purposes. 26
While the Curtis Bros. case was waiting to be heard by the
Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari, Congress enacted the Labor-
Management Reporting, and Disclosure Act, containing section
8(b) (7). However,( the Board continued to apply the Curtis
Bros. and Alloy doctrines, since it felt that section 8(b) (7) was
not meant to pre-empt the field in regulating peaceful recognition
picketing.27 This conclusion was engendered by a sentence in
section 8(b) (7) which states that the section does not permit
what is otherwise an unfair labor practice on the part of unions.
The Board felt that section 8(b) (7) served to amplify already
existing NLRA proscriptions, 2 of which Curtis Bros. and Alloy
represent two.
This reasoning might be somewhat upset by the legislative
history which provided that the Curtis Bros. and Alloy cases were
overruled to the extent that they were inconsistent with the new
section. 29 As it was not clear whether this referred to the Board
when another union had been certified as the bargaining representative of the
employees concerned. Aaron, The Labor-Management, Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959, 73 HAv. L. REv. 1086, 1101 (1960). For another
type of picketing prohibited by the section, see International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951).
23 Drivers Local 639 v. NLRB, supra note 20, at 552-53.
24 119 N.L.R.B. 307 (1957), enforcement granted in part and denied in
part, 263 F.2d 796, decree stayed in part, 265 F2d 239 (9th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 940 (1960).25 Id. at 308.
26 In the subsequent enforcement proceeding, the union was not allowed
to contest the trial examiner's conclusions as to picketing and the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed without considering the picketing
aspects of the order. NLRB v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 263 F.2d
796, 798 (9th Cir. 1959).27 Local 208, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 125 N.L.R.B. 159 (1959).28 Id. at 162 n.6.
29H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2513 (1959).
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or the appellate dispositions, 30 the Board decided to let the Supreme
Court decide whether Curtis Bros. and Alloy were improperly
decided, before it ceased using the rationale of the two cases.3'
In 1960, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals'
decision in Curtis Bros., thus dealing the NLRB a setback.3 2
The Court employed the same arguments utilized by the court below
and added that its decision found further support in the 1959
amendments, such as section 8(b) (7) (C). The high tribunal felt
that section 8(b) (7) (C) "establishes safeguards against the Board's
interference with legitimate picketing activity. . . .Were § 8(b)
(1) (A) to have the sweep contended for by the Board, the Board
might proceed against peaceful picketing in disregard of these
safeguards."3 3  Thus, a minority union may engage in peaceful
picketing for purposes of recognition if it does not transgress
sections 8(b) (7) or 8(b) (4).
The problems presented by the Curtis Bros. and Alloy cases
were meant to be disposed of by section 8(b) (7). It is suggested
that the two cases were a very important impetus to the inclusion
of the section in the 1959 amendments to the Act. Certainly a
reading of the two cases and a reading of subparagraphs (B) and
(C) of the section shows a very close relationship between the
problems presented by the fact patterns in the cases and the
proscriptions in the two subparagraphs.
The First Crown Cafeteria Case
As stated above, one critical question is presented by the
second proviso: Is picketing immunized from the proscriptions
of 8(b) (7) (C) when it has both a purpose of truthfully ad-
vising the public and an object of organization or recognition?
The NLRB was first confronted with this question on Feb-
ruary 20, 1961 when it decided the landmark Crown Cafeteria case; 34
its response was in the negative. In that case the Board determined
that the picketing had an object of recognition or organization
and had been carried on beyond a reasonable time without the
filing of a petition for a Board election. 35 Also, it was found
that the purpose was truthfully to advise the public that the
30 See Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor
Relations Act, 44 MiNr. L. IEv. 257, 269 (1959).31 See Jenkins, A Preliminary Look at Title VII, in SyiMPoSiUm ON THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DiSCLOSURE AcT OF 1959 615, 625(1959).32NLRB v. Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
33 Id. at 291.34 Local Joint Executive Bd. of Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 1961
CCH N.L.R.B. fr 9672 (Feb. 20, 1961).
35M. at 15017.
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employer did not employ union members or have a contract with a
labor union.3 6  The question, then, was squarely presented to
the Board.
In finding the union guilty of an unfair labor practice in
violation of section 8(b) (7) (C), the majority of the Board held
that where a present object of picketing is for organization or
recognition, it is of no import that it may also have a purpose of
truthfully advising the public that the employer does not have
a labor contract with, or employ members of, a labor organization. 37
The Board reached its decision on the ground that proviso two of
subparagraph (C) was not devised to carve, out of the proscriptions
of the section, two conditions under which organizational or
recognition picketing could be exercised with impunity. The
majority felt the intent of Congress was to outlaw organizational
and recognition picketing and the second proviso was "added
* . . only to make clear that purely informational picketing" within
the scope of the second proviso is not to be curtailed. 38 This being
true, the application of the proviso should be confined "to picketing
where the sole object is dissemination of information divorced
from a present object of recognition." 39 It is thus clear that the
Board felt that Congress enacted the proviso merely to protect
purely informational picketing. Also, the Board cited the legislative
history as being indicative of this position. Relying on the last
part of a paragraph in a statement made by then Senator John
F. Kennedy before the Senate on opening debate on the final
bill, the majority pointed out that the Senator had specifically stated
that the proviso only applied to purely informational picketing.40
The Board specifically stated in its opinion that a present
object of recognition will cause the picketing to be unlawful.
Section 8(b) (7) (C) does not differentiate between present or
immediate objects or any other type of object; rather it simply
386 Id. at 15018.
37 This interpretation had been proffered by several federal courts:
Department & Specialty Store Employees' Union v. Brown, 284 F.2d 619,
628 (9th Cir. 1961); McLeod v. Local 239, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 179
F. Supp. 481, 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Elliot v. Sapula Typographical Union,
38 CCH Lab. Cas. 1166020 (N.D. Okla. 1959); Phillips v. International
Ladies Garment Workers, 38 CCH Lab. Cas. 166051 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
See Glickstein and Gold, The New Labor Law: A Very Limited Management
Victory, 6 N.Y.L.F. 412, 422 (1960).38 Local Joint Executive Bd. of Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, 1961
CCH N.L.R.B. 19672, at 15018 (Feb. 20, 1961) (emphasis added).[
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid. The statement relied on reads: "Purely informational picketing
cannot be curtailed under the conference report, although even this privilege
would have been denied by the Landrum-Griffin measure." 105 CONG. REC.
17898 (1959). To what extent the Landrum-Griffin measures would have
curtailed purely informational picketing is not clear.
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states that where "an object" of picketing is for organization
or recognition, it shall be an unfair labor practice under con-
ditions specified in subparagraphs (A), (B), or (C).41 What,
then, would have been the Board's determination if the picketing
merely had an ultintate object of organization, as opposed to a
present or immediate object? This question remains unanswered
and presents some interesting problems. Under ordinary cir-
cumstances, it seems difficult to imagine a pragntatic situation
where the union's ultimate object in picketing would not be for
recognition or organization.42  It becomes progressively more
difficult to envision such a situation where legends on picket
placards impart that the employer neither employs union members
nor has a labor contract with a union. This difficulty has been
somewhat alleviated by the distinction made by some federal courts
between the immediate and ultimate objects of picketing when
they have been called on to issue labor injunctions pursuant to
provisions under the Act.4 3
In Graham v. Retail Clerks Ass'n 44 and Greene v. International
Typographical Union,45 the courts utilized this distinction in order
to avoid an extreme application of the section, which would
virtually prohibit all picketing because of the union's ultimate
objective.46 Even though the Board has not passed upon the
problem, some reference was made to this distinction in a footnote
to a recent Board decision:
Although we find . . . in agreement with the Trial Examiner . . .
we do not adopt or rely upon that portion of the Intermediate Report
relating to the distinction, sometimes made, between the so-called "ultimate"
objects and "immediate"' objects which are alleged to underlie all picketing.47
41 See note 16 supra.
42 See Greene v. International Typographical Union, 186 F. Supp. 630,
634 (D. Conn. 1960) ; Getreu v. Bartenders & Hotel & Restaurant Employees
Union, 181 F. Supp. 738, 741 (N.D. Ind. 1960); Graham v. Retail Clerks
Ass'n, 188 F. Supp. 847, 855-56 (D. Mont. 1960). But for a possible illustra-
tion of informational picketing see Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama
Steamship Co., 362 U.S. 365 (1960)..43 Greene v. International Typographical Union, 186 F. Supp. 630 (D.
Conn. 1960).44 Graham v. Retail Clerks Ass'n, supra note 42.
45 186 F. Supp. 630, 634 (D. Conn. 1960).
46 In interpreting the meaning of an objective in a section 8(b) (4) (C)
proceeding one court has said: "Picketing which is obviously for some
permissible objective should not be condemned because, arguably, there may
also be such a residual hope that a prohibited end will also be realized."
NLRB v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 245 F.2d 542, 548 (2d
Cir. 1957).
47 Teamsters Local 200, 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. (LAB. Rxt.) (CCH N.L.R.B.)
1f 10659, at 16519 n.1 (Nov. 24, 1961). For a case where the NLRB found
the union guilty of an unfair labor practice under §8(b)(4)(C) of the
act because of its ultimate end of picketing, see International Hod Carriers
Union, 1961 CCH N.L.R.B. 119630, at 14903 (Feb. 10, 1961).
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Whether this is a repudiation of the distinction as applied
to that case only, or a general repudiation, cannot be ascertained
from this quotation. If it be interpreted that the Board has made
a general repudiation of the distinction between ultimate and
immediate objects of picketing, then it would seem that the statute
could read: where an object (immediate or ultimate) of picketing
is recognition or organization, it is an unfair labor practice,
(C) where a stranger union has picketed beyond a reasonable
time without filing a petition for a Board election. Since it is
difficult to imagine when the ultimate object of a union would not
be organization or recognition, it is likewise difficult to imagine
when the picketing would, therefore, not be classified as organiza-
tional or recognition within the meaning of 8(b) (7) (C) and thus
be prohibited. Since almost all picketing would be classified as
organizational or recognition, then proviso two becomes a practical
nullity as interpreted by the Board in the first Crown Cafeteria case.48
Clearly, if the proviso only protects purely informational picketing,
then it really has no effect at all, as the ultimate object of almost
all picketing disqualifies it from being purely informational. This
would be a very harsh result and, although reached by a logical
process, would raise a constitutional question.
Constitutional Problems
It was stated by the majority in the original Crown Cafeteria
decision that it was the intent of Congress to outlaw organizational
and recognition picketing, and that proviso two did not protect
any picketing which had as an object recognition or organization.49
This creates a constitutional problem by virtue of the fact that
picketing contains elements of communication which are protected
by the first and fourteenth amendments of the federal constitution.50
In the much quoted case of Thornhill v. Alabama,5' the Su-
preme Court declared invalid on its face an Alabama statute which,
in effect, prohibited all forms of peaceful picketing.52 The Court
equated picketing with speech and thus wrapped it in the pro-
48See Getreu v. Bartenders & Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, supra
note 42, at 741.49 Local Executive Bd. of Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, 1961 CCH
N.L.R.B. ff9672, at 15017 (Feb. 20, 1961).50 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
51 Ibid.52 Ibid. The section of the statute attacked read: "Any person or persons
who picket the works or place of business of . . . other persons,
firms, corporations, or associations of persons, for the purpose of hindering,
delaying, or interfering with or injurying any lawful business or enterprise
of another, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. . . ." Id. at 91-92.
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tective cloak of the Constitution.5 3  However, the broad, en-
compassing language employed in Thornhill was later qualified.
5 4
In Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl 55 it was stated:
Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it
involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a
picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective
of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated.56
This quotation reflects the general rationale employed to
distinguish free speech from peaceful picketing, thus giving the
government power to control peaceful picketing when it contravenes
valid public policy. However, the spirit of Thornhill is not mori-
bund, as is evidenced by the case of International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. Vogt, Inc.57 In Vogt, the Court was of the opinion that a
state might place restrictions on peaceful picketing in order to
effectuate public policy, but it could not "enact blanket pro-
hibitions against picketing." 5 This warning logically applies to
the federal government as well as to the states.59
It would seem that Congress was aware of the efficacy of
Thornhill. This would tend to cast doubt upon the assumption
that section 8(b)(7)(C) was meant to be as broad a prohibition
against peaceful organizational and recognition picketing as the
majority in the first Crown Cafeteria case indicated. 4pparently
531n striking down the section of the statute, the Court said, "we think
that [the section] is invalid on its face. . . . In the circumstances of our
times the dissemination of, information concerning the facts of a labor
dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is
guaranteed by the Constitution." Id. at 101-02.
54The following cases, while not exhaustive, will be a guide to trace
the limitations which have fettered the application of Thornhill. Milkwagon
Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941); Bakery
& Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775-77 (1942) (con-
curring opinion); Gibboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490
(1949); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950); Plumbers Union v.
Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953); International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695
v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
5315 U.S. 769 (1942).
56Id. at 776 (concurring opinion).
57354 U.S. 284 (1957). In a case decided subsequent to Vogt, the
Supreme Court employed Thornhill to reverse a decision of the Kansas
Supreme Court and declared a permanent injunction on picketing issued by
a state court too restrictive. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Union v.
Newell, 356 U.S. 341 (1958) (per curiam), reversing 182 Kan. 205, 319 P.2d
171 (1957).
58 International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., supra note 54,
at 294-95.59 Lebus v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 43 CCH Lab. Cas.
r17315, at 25692 (E.D. La. 1961). See Chefs, Cooks & Pastry Cooks,
Local 189, 4 LAB. L. REP. (LAB. REL.) (CCH N.L.R.B.) IT 10940, at 17055
n.5 (Feb. 20, 1962).
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one of the reasons that the second proviso was included in the
1959 Act was to insure the constitutionality of section 8(b) (7)
(C).60 If proviso two does not serve to allow certain aspects of
recognition or organizational picketing to be exercised, perhaps
the Supreme Court might find the section more restrictive on the
element of speech contained in picketing than is necessary to effect
the declared public policy as found in the Act.61 This would
lend weight and give credence to an interpretation quite opposed
to that rendered in Crown Cafeteria in, the first opinion, i. e., that
proviso two exempts organizational and recognition picketing when
they meet certain standards. Another factor which tends to bolster
this interpretation is the legislative history.
Legislative History
The second proviso of subparagraph (C) of section 8(b)(7)
does not have an extensive legislative history. This is due to its
late insertion in the bill, for it was not a part of the bill passed
by the House and did not appear until after the bill was referred
to the joint conference committee. 62  Then, to complicate matters
further, the report of the conference 68 was not available to either
house before the passage of the final bill.6 As a result, the intent
of Congress in passing the final bill as reported out of conference
cannot accurately be ascertained from this report. The only ex-
planation of the intent and effect of proviso two, as reported by
the conference committee, that was available to both houses before
passage of the final bill, was a statement read by Senator Kennedy
in opening debate on the floor of the Senate. 65 This statement
60 See Lebus v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, supra note 59, at
25690-91.61 "It is the purpose and policy of this Act, in order to promote the full
flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and
employers in their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peace-ful procedures for preventing the interference by either with the legitimate
rights of the other, to protect the rights of individual employees in their
relations with labor organizations whose activities affect commerce, to define
and proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which affect
commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights
of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce." Taft-
Hartley § 1(b), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1958).62See Goldberg and Meiklejohn, Title VII: Taft-Hartley Amendments
with Enphasis on the Legislative History, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 747, 766-68(1960).
63 H.R. RP. 1147, 86 Cong., 1st Sess., 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2512 (1959).
64Goldberg and Meiklejohn, mipra note 62.65 Id. at 767. At any rate, H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.,
2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2512-13 (1959), does not contain an expla-
nation of proviso two.
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explained in some detail the provisions adopted by the con-
ference committee. Thus, the intent of Congress in passing the
1959 Act can best be determined by reference to that statement:
The House bill would have forbidden virtually all organizational picketing,
even though the pickets did not stop truck deliveries or exercise other
economic coercion. The amendiztents adopted in the conference secure the
right to engage in all forms of organizational picketing up to the time
of an election. . . . When the picketing results in economic pressure through
the refusal of other employees to cross the picket line, the bill would require
a prompt election.60
An analysis of the statement would seem to reveal that
proviso two was adopted by the conferees to insure that or-
ganizational and recognition picketing would not be unreasonably
restricted. Subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 8(b) (7) were
reported out of the joint conference committee unchanged in any
detail.67 The only substantial changes made as to the application
of the section were: (1) expungement of a subparagraph which
would have required a substantial showing of representation before
organizational or recognition picketing would have been allowed,68
and (2) amendment of subparagraph (C) by the adoption of the
secor d proviso. Since the statement refers to amendments adopted
to s~cure rights of organizational picketing, it seems clear that
reference was had to that proviso, as it is the only amendment
which purports to alter the proscriptions of the section. In
this light, it can be seen that the legislative history might bolster
an interpretation of the second proviso to the effect that organ-
izational or recognition picketing would be without section 8(b)
(7) (C) when it truthfully advises the public that the employer
neither hires union' members nor is a party to a collective bar-
gaining agreement. A further argument to support this position
has been given by the NLRB in its recent reversal of the Crownr
Cafeteria case on rehearing.
66 105 CONG. REc. 17898 (1959) (remarks of Senator Kennedy) (emphasis
added).
67Compare H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. §705(b) (1959), which was
the administration bill passed by the House, with the final bill S. 1555,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. §704(c) (1959).
68 This is the same interest which must be shown before the Board will
process a union's petition for a representation election. Taft-Hartley §9(c),
61 Stat. 143 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1958). Usually
the Board requires a thirty per cent showing in the absence of extenuating
circumstances. 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (Supp. 1961). It would seem to have
been extremely harsh if the Board would have required a thirty per cent
showing of interest before it would have allowed organizational or recognition
picketing.
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Reversal of Crown Cafeteria
On a motion for reconsideration, the Board reversed the
original decision in Crown Cafeteria and dismissed the complaint
against the union.69 The majority of the members (one of whom
was on the Board at the writing of the original decision of
Crown Cafeteria and dissented to that determination) adopted the
dissenting opinion of the first Crown Cafeteria case.70 The dissent
in the first decision indicated that the proviso "should be inter-
preted as having vitality" and not "as if . . . Congress had
inserted mere language intended to serve as a useless appendage
in an academic vacuum." 71 Moreover, it asserted that section
8(b) (7) (C) does not prohibit purely informational picketing; 72
thus to have vitality, the proviso must be read to allow "recognition
or organizational picketing which truthfully advised the public.
• . ., In other words, since section 8(b) (7) does not purport
to concern itself with prohibiting informational picketing, the second
proviso is mere surplusage if its function is simply to protect
that which is not in danger. This argument is very cogent in
view of the fact that it is generally accepted that a statute should
be read in a manner which gives meaning to all its parts.74
Another argument made by the dissent in the original Crown
Cafeteria case was that the majority's interpretation created an
unfair labor practice which was "wholly outside the statutory
intendment," 75 i. e., if informational picketing within the confines
of proviso two caused third party employees to refuse to cross
the picket line to render services or pick up or deliver goods,
then informational picketing becomes an unfair labor practice
subject to injunctive action as provided in the Act. This clearly
is without the scope of section 8(b) (7) as is shown by a
reading of the section-its limits of application are set at
organizational and recognition picketing. As was said by the
dissent in the first case, in closing its argument as to this phase
69Local Joint Executive Bd. of Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 4 CCH
LAB. L. ReP. (LAB. REL.) (CCH N.L.R.B.) 1110939 (Feb. 20, 1962).
7o Local Joint Executive Bd. of Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 1961 CCH
N.L.R.B. 119672, at 15019 (Feb. 20, 1961) (dissenting opinion).
71 Ibid.72 Id. at 15020 (emphasis added).
73 Id. at 15021. See Getreu v. Bartenders & Hotel & Restaurant Employees
Union, 181 F. Supp. 738 (N.D. Ind. 1960); Lebus v. Building & Constr.
Trades Council, 43 CCH Lab. Cas. 1117315 (E.D. La. 1961).
742 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4705 (3d
ed. 1943). See Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Northern
Pac. Ry., 169 F. Supp. 411, 415 (D. Minn. 1959).
75Local Joint Executive Bd, of Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 1961
CCH N.L.R.B. 119672, at 15019 (Feb. 20, 1961) (dissenting opinion).
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of its opinion: "[I]t is [not] for the Board to rewrite the 1959
amendments [to the Act]" 76 by creating new unfair labor practices
by the process of interpretation.
Finally, the dissent in the first Crown Cafeteria case was of
the opinion that the legislative history was clearly in accord with
its interpretation, and that the majority had read Senator Kennedy's
statement out of context.77 The legislative history argument has
been presented earlier in this note so it is not necessary to present
it at this point. As the legislative history is not replete, and the
statutory language is open to more than one interpretation, it would
seem difficult to establish an interpretation which would survive
each new administration's policies and philosophies. The reversal
of Crown Cafeteria was a three-to-two decision and would seem to
reflect a somewhat more liberal attitude toward the workings of the
section. It is far from being a settled question of law at this
point, because, as subsequent reconstituted Boards decide new
cases involving like situations, the attitude might well change
again.
The reversal of the Crown Cafeteria case does not present a
new interpretation of the proviso as far as the federal district
courts are concerned. In 1960, prior to the first Crown Cafeteria
decision, a district court in Getreu v. Bartenders & Hotel &
Restaurant Employees Union 7s also reached the conclusion that
proviso two was designed to exempt certain types of organizational
or recognition picketing. In that case it was admitted that an
object of the picketing was for recognition, but a purpose was
also truthfully to advise the public. In a very lucidly written
opinion, Chief Judge Swygert stated:
I think subparagraph (C) means that although "an object" of picketing
may be [recognition] . . . it is immunized from the statute if "the purpose"
of such picketing is also truthfully to inform the public that the employer
does not have a contract with the union. .... 70
This succinct statement accurately sums up the present state of the
law as promulgated by the Board in its reversal of the Crown
Cafeteria case.
Other Reflections
The Crown Cafeteria reversal strongly implied that informa-
tional picketing, when found, would not become an unfair labor
practice because employees of others refuse to cross the picket
76 Ibid.
77Id. at 15020-21.
78 181 F. Supp. 738 (N.D. Ind. 1960).
79 Id. at 741.
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line. However, Local 89, Chefs, Cooks, Pastry Cooks & As-
sistants (Stork case),8 ° was heard on a motion for reconsideration 81
the same day as Crown Cafeteria, and this question was considered.
The Board affirmed its prior determination that when recognition
or organizational picketing, within the protection of proviso two,
causes employees of others to refuse to cross the picket lines, it will
be an unfair labor practice if carried on beyond a reasonable time
without filing a petition for an election with the Board. How-
ever, the Board wished to make it explicitly clear that it would not
be an unfair labor practice if the employees of others so refuse
due to informational picketing alone,8 2 as the original opinion in the
Stork case had intimated.
83
This still leaves unanswered the question as to what constitutes
informational picketing. Will the Board now accept or reject the
test whereby a distinction is made between the ultimate and
immediate objects? Or will the Board demand a "complete divorce"
from organizational or recognition objectives? It would seem that
the Board, in consonance with its recent liberal interpretations,
will not demand that such a strict test as the latter be applied.
It is not clear, however, what test the Board will employ, but a
device will have to be utilized so that the ultimate object of all
union activity will not disqualify picketing from being informational.
Another interesting problem presents itself: what informational
picketing will be construed to fall within the limits of proviso two
so that its alternative object of recognition or organization will
be protected? Would picketing to protest an unfair labor practice
on the part of the employer be so construed? If the protest is
connected with an unfair labor practice whereby the employer
manifests that he does not wish to employ union members, then it
could be argued that it falls within the meaning of proviso two
and its object of recognition or organization is thereby protected.
It will be interesting to see the extent to which the Board will
go to insure labor that its vital weapon of picketing will not
be rendered less potent.8 4
801961 CCH N.L.R.B. 19671 (Feb. 20, 1961).
81 Chefs Locil 89, 4 CCH LAD. L. REP. (LAB. REL.) (CCH N.L.R.B.)
10940 (Feb. 20, 1962).82 1d. at 17055.
83 Local 89, Chefs, Cooks, Pastry Cooks & Assistants, 1961 CCH N.L.R.B.
19671 (Feb. 20, 1961).
84 In Department & Specialty Store Employees' Union, 4 CCH LAB.
L. REP. (LAB. REL.) (CCH N.L.R.B.) 111034 (Mar. 19, 1962), the
Board held that picketing protected by proviso two of section 8(b)
(7) (C) could not trigger an expedited election as provided in that
section. The Board stated that an expedited election under such conditions
was not a valid election within the meaning of section 8(b) (7) (B) which




The reversal of Crown Cafeteria and the holding in the Getreu
case seem to better reflect the legislative history and the plain
meaning of the section. Furthermore, these two decisions seem
to obviate the constitutional problems and avoid making the proviso
a nullity. Proviso two still appears to present formidable problems.
But once the present interpretation becomes instilled in labor
relations it should not be lightly overturned. Both management
and labor should know within what bounds they can operate
legally. The present Board's interpretation better effectuates the
policy of the Act than did the prior interpretation and should
be the one to ultimately be declared law, either by clarification by
Congress or the Supreme Court.
THE CONTRACT PROPOSALS TO THE SECOND RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Almost every author who undertakes a discussion of the con-
tracts area of the conflict of laws feels that he must preface his
remarks with some indication of the uncertainty and confusion
surrounding his topic.1 Perhaps the most basic reason for the
confusion can be traced to differences of opinion as to the very
philosophies which form the foundation of our legal system.2  But
a somewhat more mundane explanation may be found in the fact
that theorists attempted to lay down one or two simple and ap-
parently precise rules to govern this wide and complex subject,
while the courts, even when openly espousing these rules, refused
to be controlled by them.3 However, it is only fair to point
out that even before the American courts were confronted with
any "precise rules," 4 one would often find contradictory - or at
Board election. Thus, if the picketing protected by proviso two continues
after such expedited election the picketing will not be an unfair labor practice
under 8(b) (7) (B) and will continue to be protected by that proviso.
1 See, e.g., Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract (I),
23 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1909); Ehrenzweig, Contracts in the Conflict of
Laws, 59 CoLum. L. REv. 973 (1959); Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of
Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 30 YALE L.J. 565 (1921).
2See CooK, THE LOGicAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CoNFLIcT OF LAWS
3-47 (1942).
3 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CoNFLIcT oF LAWS, Introductory Note, at
2 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960).
4 See RESTATEMENT, CoNFLicT oF LAWS § 332 (1934).
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